Elites, Path Dependency and the Lack of a Stable Constitutional Arrangement in Chile and Argentina: A Comparative-Historical Analysis

Abstract

The core literature on Latin American politics has stressed the existence of path dependency among presidential regimes in the region. However, this paper offers an alternative explanation, where dependence is found in values such as central power, authority, order and elite pre-eminence, which were transformed into formal institutions, principally the Constitution. Consequently, sub-optimal decisions taken at certain critical junctures aimed at maintaining the status quo are more relevant than lasting institutional agreements, as is the case in the United States. The lack of a constitutional agreement resembles what in economics has been described as the missing social contract, where elite or temporary political coalitions with other social sectors imposed structural reforms. In order to overcome this void, Chile’s non-elite sectors pursued democratic means, whereas in Argentina this was considered only one of the available tools. Though the initial outcome for analysis is different, both countries currently share the lack of a constitutional agreement, forcing both to continue to search for lasting democratic institutions.