In this article, I challenge Peden (2014) and Brandt’s (2011) claims that Spinoza’s philosophy is essentially at odds with certain basic phenomenological positions. Against this, I argue that Spinoza’s theory of imagination is akin to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception. I justify this thesis by developing a semiotic-hermeneutic interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of imagination which makes it possible to see certain similarities between these respective philosophers’ epistemologies of perception. By highlighting the convergences between Spinoza and Merleau-Ponty, the divergences between Cartesianism and phenomenology come to the fore along with the possibility of a novel reading of phenomenology from a Spinozist perspective.
Hugo, Z. (2018). Spinoza’s Phenomenology of Perception. Revista De Filosofía, 74, pp. 91–108. Retrieved from https://revistas.uchile.cl/index.php/RDF/article/view/51881
