We propose a reading of Heidegger’s interpretation of the problem of Self-Affection in the first Kantian Critique. If the Time and the ‘I Think’ are unified is due to the notion of time as pure Self-Affection, that could capture the formation of Self without subordinating it to an extra-temporal connection. We attempt to show that Heidegger’s account considers time as a self-referential movement which however requires a delay and a retreat of itself to release what is coming. In order to allow an encounter with another, the self-affective structure must give time to herself, which prevents the autarchic closure of herself.
Durán Rojas, C. (2015). The self-affection of the other: Heidegger and the time it takes the self. Revista De Filosofía, 71, pág. 53–64. Retrieved from https://revistas.uchile.cl/index.php/RDF/article/view/37933
