This paper tries to show that there is at least a sense in which one can defend the idea that the constitution of objectivity is compatible with metaphysical realism. The point of departure is, on the one hand, the reconstruction of the main elements of Husserl's theory of constitution and, on the other hand, the analysis of an argument used by this philosopher in Logical Investigations to prove the existence of ideal objects. As Antonio Millán-Puelles has showed, one can talk of an "intentional genesis" of objects in the sense of their arising before consciousness.
Keywords:
Constitution, beings of reason, ideal objects, realism, intentional genesis, real genesis, phenomenology.
Crespo, M. (2009). ¿Hay una Teoría no Idealista de la Constitución?. Revista De Filosofía, 65, Pág. 105–114. Retrieved from https://revistas.uchile.cl/index.php/RDF/article/view/1176
