

Impact of demonetization 2016 on Venezuelan economy

Alberto Hurtado y Sadcidi Zerpa

Universidad de Los Andes, Venezuela

Abstract

This article aims to analyze the impact of demonetization 2016 on the Venezuelan economy. The Government of Venezuela demonetized the 100 bolívares notes on December 11, 2016, for achieving economic, monetary and price stability, eliminating the smuggling of banknotes, achieving a higher level of efficiency and quality in government management, and eliminating the laundering of bolívares. In this sense, the origin of the measure is presented and the proposed objectives set are explored. It results that the measure generated shortages of cash, changes in production decisions and commercialization of goods, increase in deposits in the Venezuelan banking system, change in the evolution of monetary aggregates, protests in the offices of banking, and a new distribution of the monetary cone. The originality of this work lies in it being a pioneer in analyzing the impact of demonetizations implemented in Venezuela and Latin America. It is concluded that the demonetization represented a monetary shock that altered the evolution of the economy and required complementary measures to mitigate its effects on the welfare of the population.

Keywords: economics, demonetization, money, Venezuela, monetary policy.

Venezuela: Impacto de la desmonetización 2016

Resumen

Este artículo tiene como objetivo analizar el impacto de la desmonetización 2016 en la economía venezolana. El gobierno de Venezuela desmonetizó los billetes de 100 bolívares el 11 de diciembre de 2016 para lograr estabilidad económica, monetaria y de precios, eliminar el contrabando de billetes, lograr un mayor nivel de eficiencia y calidad en la gestión gubernamental y eliminar el lavado de bolívares. En este sentido, se presenta el origen de esta medida y se exploran los objetivos propuestos. Como resultado, la desmonetización generó escasez de efectivo, cambios en las decisiones de producción y comercialización de bienes, aumento de los depósitos en el sistema bancario venezolano, cambio en la evolución de los agregados monetarios, protestas en las oficinas bancarias y una nueva distribución del cono monetario. La originalidad de este trabajo radica en que es pionero en analizar el impacto de las desmonetizaciones implementadas en Venezuela y América Latina. Se concluye que la desmonetización representó un shock monetario que alteró la evolución de la economía y requirió medidas complementarias para mitigar sus efectos sobre el bienestar de la población.

Palabras clave: economía, desmonetización, dinero, Venezuela, política monetaria.

***Dirección de correspondencia [Correspondence address]:**

Sadcidi Zerpa, Universidad de Los Andes, Venezuela

E-mail: zerpasad@ula.ve

1 Introduction

Demonetization corresponds to a measure taken by governments to reduce the problems generated by the falsification of money, the smuggling of coins and notes, and the movement of funds obtained from illegal economic activities (Lahiri, 2016; Ramdurg y Basavaraj, 2016; Rani, 2016; Kotnal, 2017). With short-term results, demonetization is used to legalize funds from the underground economy as well as to identify the size of the formal sector of the economy. It is an economic policy decision that requires a joint effort between government authorities and the central bank to guarantee the deposit and exchange of demonetized money, without harming the purchasing power of its owners (Hurtado y Zerpa, 2019a).

In this sense, it is a measure of monetary policy where the circulation of all or part of the pieces of the monetary cone is declared illegal. It usually occurs when there is an economic, political and social crisis that leads to a change of national currency by replacing the old monetary unit with a new one; front high levels of hyperinflation that generate recurrent updates of the monetary cone through the abandonment of the pieces of smaller denomination; the falsification and money laundering processes; the excessive storage of foreign currencies and national currency in cash; and the recurrent acts of corruption (Hurtado y Zerpa, 2018).

In Venezuela, after the period considered the one with the greatest economic prosperity for the country as a result of the high oil prices. The macroeconomics and microeconomics imbalances that force the implementation of demonetization measures became evident. Thus, after receiving 960,589 million dollars for oil exports between 1999 and 2014 that is, 56,700 million dollars per year on average (ONCP, 2015), the excessive use of price controls that generated a shortage of goods and forced rationing; the recurrent expropriations of private companies, which passed into government hands and became unproductive; the appearance and consolidation of parallel markets where products are exchanged at prices higher than official using cash; the excessive use of subsidies, transfers and salary adjustments from the public sector that stimulated inflation; and the consolidation of a rigid exchange control that promoted imports of raw materials and final goods, it was common.

In addition to a climate of legal and personal insecurity that drove away investments. This caused the

Venezuelan economy to begin a phase of stagnation characterized by the paralysis of productive activities, the informalization of economic relations, and the profound loss of well-being of the population. In this context, there was an increase in the importance of cash. This conditioned the decision making of the economic agents and hindered the achievement of the objectives of the economic policy implemented by the Venezuelan government.

Thus, on December 11, 2016, the Government of President Nicolas Maduro announced the process of demonetization of the 100 bolívares note. It was the purpose of: a) Achieving economic, monetary and price stability, b) Eliminating the smuggling of banknotes, c) Assuring the population the enjoyment of their economic rights and access to merchandise, d) Achieving a higher level of efficiency and quality in government management, and e) Eliminating the laundering of bolívares (Hurtado y Zerpa, 2019a, 2019b). In a context of: 1) Stagnation of productive activity, 2) Generalization of parallel markets, 3) Shortage of cash, and 4) High inflation, demonetization was a monetary shock measure with economic, political and social implications for the entire country.

In this sense, the article aims to analyze the impact of demonetization 2016 on the Venezuelan economy. For this, the economy of Venezuela in the period 2010-2015 is described. In the next section, the proposed objectives set are explored, the origin of the measure is presented, and the effects of the demonetization are identified. The results obtained by this government policy are presented below and, in the last section, the conclusions are identified.

2 Venezuelan economy 2010-2015

Before the government's decision to demonetize the highest denomination note in the Venezuelan economy. It was evident the wear of the growth model based on the protection of the population through abundant subsidies, transfers, and salary increases. Public policy that used oil income to encourage the demand for products. Macroeconomic imbalances: GDP decline, inflation, fiscal deficit, trade deficit, loss of international reserves, among others, appeared in the first years of the second decade of the 21st century, without the need for a change in the cycle of international oil prices. In this sense, to understand the impact of demonetization 2016 on the Venezuelan economy, the macroe-

conomic context before the implementation of the measure is described below.

Venezuela suffered the effects of the global financial crisis of 2008 and the fall in commodity prices in 2009, which was reflected in a contraction of the economy by 1.5% during 2010. The recovery of oil prices in 2011 and 2012, the increase in public sector spending, the increase in imports and the rise in domestic consumption allowed the economy to recover, an annual inflation rate of less than 25%, reduction of the government's external debt, and a slight increase in international reserves (see Table 1). Macroeconomic results that favored the candidacy of the government party during the 2013 presidential elections.

The political, economic and social conflict evident in 2013, due to the death of President Hugo Chavez, the call for new presidential elections, the election of President Nicolas Maduro, and the protests resulting from the non-recognition of the results. In addition to the use of economic policies that implied: a) New controls on the economy, b) The implementation of new missions and large social missions, c) Successive expropriations and occupations of private companies, and d) The maintenance of exchange control. This forced consumption and real investment downwards, which hurts the level of growth of the Venezuelan economy. Despite increased public spending, rising external debt and stable oil prices of over \$100, Venezuela's economy stagnated in 2013, falling 3.9% in 2014 and 6.2% in 2015.

In addition to the fall of the economy, the government increased the fiscal deficit. This was financed through a larger monetary base, more public debt and the liquidation of international reserves. All this increased inflation to 180.9% in 2015. This macroeconomic situation of the country was maintained during the first months of 2016, favoring: 1) The consolidation of parallel markets, 2) Price arbitrage to take advantage of the difference between the official price and the parallel, and 3) The use of cash to carry out these activities outside the law.

3 Origin of demonetization in Venezuela

On December 11, 2016, the Venezuelan government announced the demonetization of the 100 bolívares bills issued by the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV, by its initials in Spanish). To this end, it established that, within 72 hours following the publi-

cation of Decree No. 2,589, of the state of exception and economic emergency, in the Extraordinary Official Gazette No. 6,275 of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the highest denomination note of the Venezuelan economy was declared illegal to be used in exchange for goods and services. In this way, it represented a measure taken without prior notice, which was made known insisting on the need to address the country's monetary problems.

As complementary measures to the announcement of the demonetization, it was established that the 100 bolívares banknotes would have a validity of 72 hours to be deposited or exchanged for legal tender banknotes in the offices of banks owned by the public sector. Demonetized banknotes that were not exchanged or deposited within the established period were declared without liberating power. That is, without the capacity to be used as a means of payment. However, their owners had ten additional banking days to exchange them at the ticket offices set up for this purpose by the BCV. The one hundred bolívares bills presented to the BCV and public banks were exchanged for their entire nominal value in pieces of lesser denomination of the current monetary cone. The BCV was in charge of the application and execution of the demonetization measure. In this sense, the Venezuelan issuing entity had assumed the commitment to put into circulation as of December 15 a new family of paper money to expand the current monetary cone, which included the issuance of five new bills of the greater denomination: 500, 1,000, 2,000, 5,000, 10,000 and 20,000 bolívares. And the country's land, air, and maritime borders were closed during the period given for the circulation of the 100 bolívares note, to prevent the return of the funds in that denomination obtained from illegal activities to Venezuela.

4 Objectives of demonetization in Venezuela

Demonetization was presented as a policy capable of achieving a multiplicity of objectives. In this order, the Venezuelan government and the BCV set themselves the main objectives: a) Guarantee and defend economic stability, ensuring the monetary and price stability of the Venezuelan economy; b) Eliminate the smuggling of banknotes, the economic war, the exchange distortion and the induced inflation that sectors of the population were using to destabilize the Venezuelan financial system and undermine the quality of life of the inhabitants of this country; c) Ensure that citizens enjoy economic

Table 1: Macroeconomics Indicators for Venezuela, 2010-2015

Variable	Unit of measurement	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Real sector							
Real GDP	Change in %	-1,5	4,2	5,6	1,3	-3,9	-6,2
Real GDP per capita	Dollars/year, 1997	1891	1973	2091	2089	1980	1832
Real consumption	Change in %	5,957	6,187	6,86	4,44	-3,45	-7,75
Real investment	Change in %	3,19	24,59	23,3	-9,03	-16,91	-17,6
Monetary sector							
Monetary base	Change in %	26,12	40,38	55,34	65,79	70,38	111,21
Inflation	Percentage	27,2	27,6	19,54	52,66	64,69	180,9
Real interest rate active	Percentage	-18,9	-8,58	-3,15	-36,97	-47,31	-160,73
Real interest rate passive	Percentage	-22,44	-11,14	-5,04	-38,16	-50,03	-165,79
Public sector							
Central government revenue	Percentages of GDP	19,3	22,5	25,1	25,9	30,1	18,95
Central government expenditure	Percentages of GDP	22,9	27,5	39,7	39,96	46,6	36,6
Central government fiscal balance	Percentages of GDP	-3,6	-5	-14,6	-14,06	-16,5	-17,65
External public debt	Percentages of Exports	122,9	122,1	115,6	126,3	156,9	322,9
External sector							
Exports	Millions of dollars	66,88	93,74	97,882	88,754	74,715	29,531
Imports	Millions of dollars	41,732	52,572	69,955	57,184	47,518	27,987
Current account balance	Millions of dollars	1,948	4,968	2,592	4,657	3,619	-13,364
International reserves	Millions of dollars	29,663	29,889	29,927	21,649	22,083	16,374
Oil prices Venezuela	Average	71,97	101,06	103,42	100,6	88,4	44,7

Source: BCV (several years), prepared by the authors.

rights and free access to goods and services, as well as the progressive satisfaction of individual and collective needs; d) Achieve greater efficiency and quality in government management aimed at restructuring the Venezuelan economy; and e) Eliminate the laundering of bolívares for illegal activities from the border with Colombia (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 2016; Hurtado y Zerpa, 2019b).

About these objectives since the announcement of the demonetization of the 100 bolívares note, the Venezuelan authorities insisted on demonstrating the negative effects of the smuggling of coins and goods. Also, counterfeiting and money laundering at the borders between Colombia and Brazil with Venezuela. In this regard, the demonetization sought to eliminate the nominal value of all 100 bolívares bills located outside the country; generate a drop in the demand for cash at the border to recover the purchasing power of the bolívar, and eliminate the formation of the parallel bolívar-dollar exchange rate.

To analyze the impact of this measure, a documentary study segmented into two parts was carried out. Below, the theoretical and empirical effects of this government measure are reviewed. The impact of demonetization is then analyzed, taking into account changes in the macroeconomic variables of the country.

5 Effects of demonetization in Venezuela

Given the speed of the measure, the short, medium and long-term effects of the demonetization of the 100 bolívares note were not long in coming in the Venezuelan economy. In this sense, it highlights the impact of politics on the daily dynamics of economic agents, causing changes in the consumption, production and savings decisions of Venezuelans. And the change in the government's position stands out due to the initial results of the measure. This allowed to solve the liquidity difficulties of the Venezuelan public sector and to reduce the number of bolívares destined to illegal activities.

The main effect of the demonetization policy was the shortage of cash as a consequence of the outflow of 77% of the circulating money in the country. This situation caused consumers to advance the purchase of goods and services to get rid of the 100 bolívares banknotes, which in turn generated two effects: the reduction of savings of unbanked economic agents

and the increase in inflationary pressures existing in the economy. The decisions of production and commercialization of goods in the country were modified due to: 1) Lack of cash that raised the costs of the productive activities highly dependent on this means of payment and 2) High uncertainty about what to do with the demonetized notes received in the commercial exchange. In this sense, many commercial establishments remained closed due to the unwillingness of their owners to accept 100 bolívares bills during the duration of the measure.

A stage began, which continues in the country, of price discrimination of raw materials, inputs, and goods based on the difference in the payment system to be used. That is the identification of at least two prices per product, one in cash and another using a debit card. In this regard, the price of products was considerably lower if they were paid in cash and with banknotes other than 100 bolívares compared to the price paid using demonetized notes, debit cards, credit cards or electronic transfers. In this way, demonetization made it difficult to identify the true exchange value of goods in the country, undermining the bases of the Venezuelan economy's pricing system, and encouraging the upward trend in inflation.

The deposits of public and private banks in the Venezuelan banking system increased as a result of the government's decision to give the banks belonging to the Venezuelan government the exclusive right to exchange and deposit 100 bolívares notes, a decision that was later extended to private banks. The limited installed capacity of banking institutions to absorb the high demand for their services; led them to restrict deposits per client, which generated the appearance of managers to deposit and exchange demonetized banknotes in the formal banking system. The proximity of the expiration of the 72-hour term given by the government to demonetize the highest denomination banknote in the economy provoked implausible behavior on the part of economic agents, among which they are: a) People who charged commissions to deposit funds in banks in an environment where all customers needed to go to the bank and, therefore, the costs of this activity were high; b) Savers who threw their notes into the air, throwing away their savings, due to the impossibility of depositing all their resources in banking institutions; c) People who decided to bury their resources, putting under the ground boxes with notes of 100, to avoid participating in the vortex of stress, uncertainty and speculation that became the day of

demonetization; and d) Fall in the nominal value of the demonetized banknote, in this way, the funds expressed in 100 bolívares notes were exchanged up to 40% less than their nominal value for coins and bills of other denominations in the informal financial system, that is to say, during the exchange of a 100 bolívares notes only 60 bolívares were given in paper currency of other denominations.

In terms of the dynamics of productive activity, the agricultural sector, and the services and manufacturing sectors faced changes in the prices. Their raw materials and inputs depending on the nature of the payment system used: in cash or with cards. They also evidenced the paralysis of their activities during December 12, 13, 14 and 15, 2016 as a consequence of the uncertainty about the legality of receiving 100 bolívares banknotes and the uses to be given to the funds collected in that denomination.

Another effect of demonetization was the reduction in consumption; due to the shortage of cash. Sectors such as transport and marketing of agricultural goods and food saw a reduction in sales in the first days of the exit of circulation of 100 notes. A situation that was reversed as the use of alternative payment systems became widespread. In that order, the use of electronic payment systems, debit cards, credit cards, checks and other options for the purchase of products without the need for cash increased.

In the liquidity shock caused by the government measure; there were also protests in the offices of banking institutions and the regional headquarters of the BCV; looting of businesses and trades; vandalism and a shortage of necessities due to the fear of their commercialization using demonetized banknotes. Due to the weak banking infrastructure and the continuous telecommunications failures in the country, the installed capacity of the public and private banks were exceeded. Even working until midnight and with clients in front of the banking entities, they were unable to attend all the deposit requests, which generated discomfort and confusion among the population. In the communities without banking entities, small cities and towns of the country; there was a paralysis of productive activity and commercial exchange because economic agents could not deposit their funds in demonetized banknotes or cancel their commitments with suppliers. With respect to the impact on the commercialization and distribution of products, from hours before the deadline for the circulation of the 100 note to Friday, December 16 and Saturday, December 17, 2016,

looting was recorded throughout the national territory, highlighting the events that occurred in the states of Sucre, Delta Amacuro, Anzoátegui, Trujillo, Mérida, Barinas, Apure, Táchira, Zulia, and Bolívar (Hurtado y Zerpa, 2019a).

As a consequence of not being able to deposit all of the paper money; coupled with the inconvenience and anguish of losing their funds or falling into the hands of informal financial operators, the population protested and then attacked the commercial sector. These acts caused the paralysis of the commercial sector, closure of establishments, losses to their owners and unemployment.

Similarly, protests and road closures occurred in the towns closest to the border with Colombia and Brazil. The low-level of bancarization of the border populations generated tension and protests in the border populations causing the closure of the border during and after the measure was executed. In this context, Oliveros and Oliveros (2016) consider that the untimely withdrawal of the highest denomination note caused: 1) Greater control of available money, 2) Collapse of the payment system, 3) Incapacity of the BCV to, in such a short-term, remove the 100 bolívar notes from circulation and incorporate the new pieces of the monetary cone into the economy, and 4) Diverted attention from the country's problems.

The measure also led to the seizure abroad of more funds in banknotes of 100. The largest Venezuelan denomination paper currency is printed on high-quality paper and its face value is negligible in the face of the country's inflationary reality, it is attractive for counterfeiting banknotes, as well as for mobilizing resources from drug trafficking, illegal currency exchange, and other underground economic activities. In this sense since 2015 there have been reports of the seizure of large quantities of 100 bolívares banknotes outside the national territory, highlighting: a) Detention of people of various nationalities trying to obtain abroad large quantities of bolívares bills; b) Seizure, on January 6, 2016, of 140,000 of 100 bolívares in the border Brazil-Venezuela; c) Seizure of more than 30 million bolívares between February and April 2016 by Brazilian authorities in Roraima; and d) Capture, on July 1, 2016, of two Ukrainian and Russian citizens in Manaus trying to airlift 7.3 million in 100 bolívares notes (Pimentel, 2016). After the demonetization has been implemented, there are reports of Venezuelan banknotes traffic at least three countries: Colombia, Brazil, and Paraguay (Hurtado y Zerpa, 2019a). These op-

erations account for the resources expressed in bolívares in the hands of foreign economic agents and the alternative uses of Venezuelan paper money in the illegal economy.

Similarly, the Venezuelan government managed to resolve the liquidity difficulties of its owned banks and after the 72-hour demonetization deadline, decided to extend the measure for two more weeks until January 2, 2017, to collect paper money. The impact caused by the extension was not as expected, there was still illegal money in circulation, queues continued at banking institutions to deposit or exchange the 100 banknotes, and economic agents continued to be uncertain about what to do with the demonetized note. This environment of shortage of cash and high inflation led the authorities to give up to 13 extensions to the date for the withdrawal of circulation of the 100 bolívar note (see Table 2), extending the demonetization process for more than one year and eight months until the execution of the monetary reconversion measure or reexpression of the country's monetary system unit scheduled for June 4, 2018. A measure that was later postponed to August 4 of the same year, due to: 1) Deepening of the country's macroeconomic problems, 2) Financial difficulties of the national executive, and 3) Limitations for the import of all the pieces of the new monetary cone, the government postponed the start date of the monetary reconversion to August 20, establishing new guidelines for its implementation.

In this sense, the incomplete demonetization of the 100 note caused widespread discontent among the population due to the high costs that people had to assume to maintain and use all the funds accumulated in the illegally decreed note; it caused changes in the consumption, production, and investment decisions of Venezuelans who had to migrate to payment systems that allow cashless transactions; it did not eliminate the incentives for extracting the 100 bolívares banknotes, as well as the new larger denomination notes, from the national territory to the border; it caused a change in the confidence of Venezuelans in the local currency and their perception of the role of the authorities and decisions taken by the BCV. This marked the beginning of a period of high uncertainty in the country's economic activities and deterioration in the indicators of the population's well-being and quality of life.

6 Impact of demonetization on the Venezuelan economy

At present, there are no official documents available where the Venezuelan government and the BCV give an account of the results obtained. In this regard, there are only press releases and journalistic reviews describing the words of the President of the Republic and officials of the issuing entity. In this sense, the following section delves into the impact of the implemented monetary policy. Presenting the official description of the results obtained. And analyzing the changes in the macroeconomic variables before, during, and after the measure.

The first result of the demonetization was to remove from circulation 4.3 billion 100 bolívar banknotes, with a value of 430 billion bolívares. In declarations by the President of the Republic given in the framework of the presentation of the balance of the measure and the first extension of the validity of the 100 bolívar note, the amount collected allowed the national banking system to go from having an availability of 5% of the pieces of the demonetized note before the measure to accumulate more than 70% of the units of that note in the three days following the presentation of the decree. The impossibility of timely collecting the remaining 30% of banknotes in the hands of economic agents led the government to extend for the first time the date for withdrawal of circulation of the 100 bolívar banknote.

As a result of the demonetization measure, two effects were achieved in the evolution of the monetary aggregates: firstly, its growth speed slowed down from December 2016 to February 2017 and, secondly, it began a phase of expansion of the different financial assets circulating in the national economy until reaching 25.38% monthly between March and November 2017. Both M1 and M2 and M3 showed an increase of 22.74% between October and November 2016, a rate considered high if one takes into account that the average of the previous months was 10%, a situation reached due to measures to stimulate consumption, increase wages and salaries, advance payment of bonuses at the end of the year (bonuses and profits), as well as the increase in transfers from the public sector via social missions (Hurtado y Zerpa, 2016a, 2016b). In December 2016 cash in public hands, demand deposits and transferable savings deposits increased 13.28% and in January 2017 grew 10.61%, that tends to decrease in the rate of growth of M1 continued until February 2017 when it reached 8.36%. Starting in March 2017 all monetary aggregates grew at rates above

Table 2: Schedule of extensions to the 100 bolívar banknote

Extension	New Date	Decree/ Official Gazette
1st	January 2, 2017	Decree N° 2,610 in Extraordinary Official Gazette N° 6,278 of December 17, 2016
2nd	January 20, 2017	Decree N° 2,646 in Official Gazette N° 41,063 of December 29, 2016
3rd	February 20, 2017	Decree N° 2,671 in Official Gazette N° 41,075 of January 16, 2017
4th	March 20, 2017	Decree N° 2,722 in Official Gazette N° 41,098 of February 17, 2017
5th	April 20, 2017	Decree N° 2,756 in Official Gazette N° 41,116 of March 17, 2017
6th	May 20, 2017	Decree N° 2,819 in Official Gazette N° 41,133 of April 18, 2017
7th	July 20, 2017	Decree N° 2,875 in Official Gazette N° 41,154 of May 19, 2017
8th	September 20, 2017	Decree N° 2,993 in Official Gazette N° 41,196 of July 19, 2017
9th	November 20, 2017	Decree N° 3,086 in Official Gazette N° 41,240 of September 20, 2017
10th	January 20, 2018	Decree N° 3,169 in Official Gazette N° 41,282 of November 20, 2017
11th	March 20, 2018	Decree N° 3,249 in Official Gazette N° 41,323 of January 18, 2018
12th	May 20, 2018	Decree N° 3,328 in Official Gazette N° 41,364 of March 20, 2018
13th	Until the circulation of the pieces of the current monetary cone and its replacement by the coins and notes of the sovereign bolívar	Decree N° 3,430 in Official Gazette N° 41,399 of May 17, 2018


Source: Prepared by the authors.

10%, reaching levels above 60% between October and November 2017. As Figure 1 shows, Venezuela's monetary aggregates did not evolve stably during and after the demonetization process, mainly because of the government's interest in stimulating the economy through expansionary fiscal policy. This strategy increased the demand for coins and notes and made the government put more money in circulation. The situation accelerated the spiral of galloping inflation that Venezuela lived for years.

In this context, the gap between the demand for deposits and the demand for coins and notes by the Venezuelan population widened. Until October 2016 the demand for deposits was 4,302 million bolí-

vares on average per month, higher than the demand for cash, from November of that year the gap grew above 6,000 million bolívares, and after the demonetization measure, in view of the uncertainty about what to do with the funds in notes of 100, the demand for deposits in the Venezuelan economy exceeded, on average every month between December 2016 and November 2017, 21,417 million bolívares to the balances that the population maintained in coins and notes. This implies the preference of Venezuelans to maintain their funds in the banking system; the immediate response of the population to the scenario of cash shortages caused by the outflow of the 100 bolívar note; and the mechanism preferred by the government to maintain the expansion of pub-

Figure 1: Evolution of monetary aggregates Venezuela



Source: BCV (several years).

lic spending. While coins and bills in the hands of the public only represented a monthly average of 1,817 million bolívars between November 2016 and November 2017, funds in deposits of the population reached a monthly average of 23,099 million bolívars in the same period (see Figure 2). This result shows that Venezuela is a country of low dependence on cash. And demonetization only increased the gap between the funds that the population maintains in cash and as deposits in banks.

As for the payment systems used in the economy, during September 2016, credit cards operating under the Visa, Mastercard, American Express and Diners Club franchises, with national and international coverage were accepted at 432,845 points of sale, located in 349,229 affiliated businesses in the country, and 38,680 additional establishments only received the American Express card from the Banco Occidental de Descuento. Debit cards issued by public and private banks for national use only were received at 432,728 points-of-sale terminals, installed at 349,111 affiliated companies and 9,917 ATMs (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 2016).


After demonetization, both the number of point of sale terminals for credit and debit cards, and the number of ATMs distributed throughout the country decreased as a result of: the low availability of point of sale terminal equipment in the country's main banks, limitations on the sector's access to foreign exchange to guarantee the purchase of this technology abroad, the telecommunications system crisis, and disincentives to investment in the banking system, all of which prevented the high demand for this type of service from being met. In January 2017 credit cards were used through 431,813 points of sale located in 336,634 companies, debit cards

were received in 431,813 points of sale terminals installed in 336,634 affiliated businesses, and 9,767 operating ATMs were reported (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 2018). That is, 1,032 points of sale and 12,595 fewer companies to provide credit card service, 915 points of sale and 12,477 affiliated companies that ceased to provide debit card service, and 150 ATMs ceased to operate compared to September 2016. This influenced the evolution of the demand for products; brought about the appearance of queues for the use of available points of sale; and became an incentive for price differentiation. The shops with points of sale established higher prices for their products due to the opportunity they gave their customers to pay with debit or credit cards.

Thus, the shortage of cash, the high inflation and the reduced number of alternative payment systems led the Venezuelan consumer to make greater use of point-of-sale terminals, equipment that saw its operations grow by 41% between June 2016 and June 2017, where 218,561,775 and 308,172,103 operations, respectively. Within this framework, debit cards were used more than credit cards; the former went from 185,777,509 transactions in June 2016 to 261,946,288 in June 2017; and the latter grew from 32,784,266 transactions in June 2016 to 46,225.815 in June 2017 (SUDEBAN, 2017), which demonstrates the population's preference for cash payment instead of debt, the use of debit cards as a substitute for cash, and traders' predilection for the immediate transfer of funds to avoid the loss of purchasing power of resources as a result of inflation.

Despite the demonetization measure, the 100 note maintained its preponderance in the Venezuelan economy, due to the increase in its issuance and the increase in its role within the cash in circula-

Figure 2: Evolution of cash in the hands of the public and demand for deposits Venezuela



Source: BCV (several years).

tion. Between 2015 and 2016 the number of 100 banknotes increased by 116.1%, while between 2016 and 2017 it increased by 35.9%, at a time when the amount of money in circulation grew by 101.5% and 37%, respectively, during each period (see Table 3). In this context, by 2015 the 100 banknotes represented 71.07% of the money in circulation, while during 2016, despite the demonetization, this paper increased to 76.19%. Except for the 50 bolívar note, all other pieces of the monetary cone in Venezuela have a marginal weight in the distribution of banknotes in the economy. This is a consequence of high inflation; the preference of the national executive for the issuance of the highest denomination notes as a mechanism to facilitate the population's access to funds allocated via transfers; the need for economic agents to reduce their transaction costs through the use of 50 and 100 bolívar notes; the high cost to the population of using the lowest denomination coins and notes; and the high demand for high denomination pieces of the monetary cone to carry out transactions in parallel markets for goods and services.

In 2017 the expansion of the monetary cone materialized, bringing with it seven new bills and generates a new distribution of each piece of the monetary cone. The 100 bolívar note stands out as the piece of greatest circulation representing 22.05% of the cash, followed by the new 10,000, 100,000 and 5,000 bolívar banknotes that represented 14.53%, 14.35%, and 12.25%, respectively during that year. These results show that the demonetization measure did not man-

age to take the 100 note out of circulation, nor did it diminish its importance in the economy.

Another result of the demonetization was the weakening of interest rates received by bank customers for their savings and fixed-term deposits, together with the abrupt increase in the interest rate charged by banks for lending. Local money market passive interest rates, what people receive for depositing their resources in banks have been aligned to a downward bias since December 2016 as a result of the management of the BCV and the demonetization measure of the 100 note. Thus, between July and November 2016 the banks paid for funds in savings deposits and fixed-term deposits, on average, 12.64% and 15.10% respectively, while during the execution of the demonetization measure only paid 12.59% and 14.57% (December 2016), this trend was maintained during 2017 for savings deposits that ended up paying, on average between January and November, 12.55% monthly return to Venezuelan savers; while the interest rate for fixed-term deposits showed slight increases until reaching an average monthly balance of 14.67% in the same period. These results account for a strategy of the disincentive to savings and stimulus to consumption. On the other hand, the interest rate of loans granted by banks grew 3.63% between November and December 2016, as a consequence of the high demand for money evident during the demonetization, which made the financing of economic agents more expensive (see Figure 3). This situation reversed during

Table 3: **Distribution of banknotes in circulation Venezuela**

Banknotes	2015	2016	2017	2015	2016	2017
2	16,082,594.81	21,196,621.04	20,692,687.97	0.44	0.29	0.06
5	41,574,210.47	47,402,355.54	53,037,956.64	1.13	0.64	0.15
10	76,400,464.54	92,100,172.94	119,665,678.40	2.08	1.24	0.34
20	175,259,308.48	207,584,572.39	260,915,950.37	4.77	2.81	0.75
50	752,578,789.10	1,393,046,563.77	1,904,132,134.17	20.50	18.83	5.48
100	2,608,908,597.03	5,637,112,332.40	7,659,511,485.10	71.07	76.19	22.05
500	-	-	1,687,094,977.50	-	-	4.86
1,000	-	-	3,277,562,505.00	-	-	9.43
2,000	-	-	1,223,827,080.00	-	-	3.52
5,000	-	-	4,257,359,820.00	-	-	12.26
10,000	-	-	5,047,640,350.00	-	-	14.53
20,000	-	-	4,243,474,980.00	-	-	12.22
100,000	-	-	4,984,812,300.00	-	-	14.35
Total	3,670,803,964.44	7,398,442,618.09	34,739,727,905.16	100	100	100


Source: BCV (several years).

2017 when the monthly rate charged by banks averaged 21.49% between January and November. This result was due to expectations about the new pieces of the monetary cone, and the frequent extensions to the deadline for the circulation of the 100 note, all of which reduced the pressure on the demand for money and reduced the cost of borrowing.


The demonetization slowed the rate of inflation growth. However, it did not prevent prices in the economy from continuing to rise, nor did it facilitate the strengthening of the national currency. Thus, Venezuelan inflation reached an average monthly growth rate of 17.98% between December 2016 and May 2017, slightly below the average monthly price variation of 20.78% evidenced between July and November 2016, caused by the demonetization and the decrease in the growth rate of monetary aggregates (see Figure 4). This result ended up being much lower than the behavior of month-to-month prices between June and November 2017, where it reached a monthly average of 36.6% and exceeded for the first time the threshold of 50% per month, this as a result of the government's strategy of higher public spending expressed in recurrent increases in wages, salaries, bonuses, and pensions, which pushed up the amount of money in circulation. In this order, in the face of a stagnant econ-

omy, the government led to the printing of new coins and notes causing greater price volatility. Thus, Venezuela abandoned its long history of galloping inflation that began in 1983 (Hurtado y Zerpa, 2017) and began to go through a hyperinflationary cycle. According to data from the Venezuelan National Assembly, in 2018 inflation closed at 1,698,488.2%.

And concerning the impact of demonetization on productive activity, the Venezuelan economy fell in 2016 for the third consecutive year. This climate of recession was a consequence of the government's strategy of nationalization of companies; temporary occupation of productive units; sanctions and closures of business organizations; generalized use of price controls; strict control of the exchange rate that was maintained for more than 10 years, causing an overvaluation of the currency, encouraging imports and limiting access to imported raw materials; rigid control of quantities; continuous increases in public spending; and a drop in the international price of Venezuelan oil. This forced the paralysis of productive activity and generated the closing of companies. This result can be seen in the fall of 3.89% and 6.22% in real gross domestic product during 2014 and 2015, respectively (IMF, 2018).



Source: BCV (several years).



Source: National Assembly of Venezuela, own estimates (several years).

The recessive environment thus recognized deepened in 2016, due to the liquidity shock implied by the exit of the 100 bolívar note from circulation, closing that year with a fall of 16.46% (IMF, 2018) in productive activity that is, the production of goods was reduced three times more compared to the fall evidenced during 2015. The effects of demonetization, mainly those generated by: a) successive extensions to the exit of the demonetized banknote, b) delay in the incorporation of the new pieces of the monetary cone, c) delay in the adaptation of the banking system's technology to the highest denomination notes, and d) validity of incentives for the demand for cash in parallel markets, had an impact on the Venezuelan economy, which during 2017 contracted by 14% (IMF, 2018), thus ending for the fourth consecutive year in recession.

7 Conclusions

The Venezuelan economy entered into crisis as a result of the use of economic policies that implied: 1) controls on the economy, 2) successive expropriations and occupations of private companies, and 3) maintenance of exchange control. This encouraged the consolidation of parallel markets, price arbitrage, and the use of cash to carry out these activities outside the law. The demonetization deepened these macroeconomic distortions.

Given the existence of money laundering processes; the smuggling of banknotes; the excessive storage of national currency in cash; and evidence of prices volatility in the Venezuelan economy, the Nicolas Maduro government decided on December 11, 2016, to take out of circulation 100 bolívar notes. This policy represented a monetary shock that altered the evolution of the economy and required complementary measures to mitigate its negative effects on the welfare of the population.

Thus, the demonetization generated in the Venezuelan economy: 1) cash shortage as a consequence of the outflow of 4,300 million banknotes, 77% of the money circulating in the country; 2) change in production decisions and commercialization of goods, due to increased costs and uncertainty about what to do with demonetized banknotes; 3) increase in deposits in the Venezuelan banking system; 4) greater use of electronic payment systems, debit cards, credit, checks and other options for the purchase of products without the need for cash; 5) protests in the offices of banking institutions, regional headquarters of the BCV, and acts of vandal-

ism against the commercial sector; 6) greater seizure abroad of funds expressed in notes of 100; 7) change in the evolution of monetary aggregates, which grew at a lower rate between December 2016 and February 2017, and then entered into an expansion phase from March 2017 to the present; 8) a rise in the difference between the demand for deposits and the demand for coins and notes; 9) despite the demonetization, the issuance of the 100 note increased and its role within the cash in circulation rose; 10) the passive interest rate decreased and the active interest rate expanded; 11) the inflation growth speed slowed down, a result that was reversed as of March 2017; and 12) the fall in productive activity increased.

References

- Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (2016). *Extraordinary Official Gazette No. 6,275*.
- Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (2018). *Extraordinary Official Gazette No. 6,379*.
- Hurtado, A. y Zerpa, S. (2016a). Misiones sociales: Contextualización de su origen, concepto y evolución. En Hurtado, A., editor, *Misión Alimentación: Origen, evolución e impacto*, pp. 17–52. ULA, CDCHTA, Mérida.
- Hurtado, A. y Zerpa, S. (2016b). Misiones sociales en Venezuela: concepto y contextualización. *Sapienza Organizacional*, 3(6):37–64.
- Hurtado, A. y Zerpa, S. (2017). Hiperinflación en Venezuela: ¿cómo enfrentarla. En *Ciclo de Conferencias con motivo del Centenario del Natalicio del Dr. Ezio Valeri Moreno*. Mérida.
- Hurtado, A. y Zerpa, S. (2018). India: Results of demonetization 2016. *Humania del Sur*, 13(25):169–186.
- Hurtado, A. y Zerpa, S. (2019a). *India-Venezuela: Análisis comparativo de las medidas de desmonetización*. ULA, GEEA, Mérida.
- Hurtado, A. y Zerpa, S. (2019b). India-venezuela: Analysis of demonetization measures. *International Journal of Advances in Management and Economics*, 8:58–67.
- IMF (2018). *Country Data: Venezuela*.
- Kotnal, J. (2017). Demonetization impact the Indian economy: A descriptive study. *International Journal of Applied Research*, 3(3):599–603.

- Lahiri, A. (2016). Demonetization, the cash shortage and the black money. *Working Paper*, (184).
- ONCP (2015). *Informe Venezuela 11-02*.
- Pimentel, O. (2016). Investigan tráfico de 150 millones en billetes de 100 en brasil. *El Nacional*, 26 de noviembre.
- Ramdurg, A. y Basavaraj, C. (2016). Demonetization: Redefining indian economy. *International Journal of Commerce and Management Research*, 2(12):7-12.
- Rani, G. (2016). Effects of demonetization on retail outlets. *International Journal of Applied Research*, 2(12):400-401.
- SUDEBAN (2017). *Boletín trimestral indores financieros*, 24(98).